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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the EU’s influence in shaping the global governance for 
telecommunications and the Internet. Through analyzing EU behavior within an 
actorness framework, we demonstrate how the external opportunity structure and the 
EU’s internal environment has impacted on its ability to exert and maximize its presence 
in order to meet its goals and aims in these two very different sub-sectors of global 
communications in terms of evolution and development. Such a comparison of EU 
actorness, we argue, is revealing in terms of uncovering the underlying factors and 
conditions that allow the EU to influence two important and dynamic communications 
sub-sectors. 
 
  
Paper prepared for the GARNET Conference, Brussels, 22-24 April, 2010 
 
First draft. Please do not cite without the permission of authors. Comments 
welcome!  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
INTRODUCTION     
This paper focuses on the degree of influence which the EU has been able to exert in 
global electronic network communications. The sector itself is complex, growing, 
differentiated and, at the same time, convergent in character. However, for heuristic 
purposes, it can be usefully thought of as comprising the traditional sub-sectors of mass 
communications broadcasting, telecommunications and, more recently, the Internet. This 
paper places its focus on the Internet and telecommunications through an analysis of the 
recent features of the evolving international political economy of both sub-sectors, with 
which the EU is shown to have had a significant degree of engagement. There has been 
little work on the role of the EU in global electronic network communications (though 
see Singh 2008; Humphreys and Simpson 2005, chapter 7; Christou and Simpson 2007), 
less still on a direct cross-comparison of the EU’s performance globally within the sector. 
The paper illustrates how, in telecommunications, a long established sector with origins 
in the late 1800s, its well established national-centricity and history has, paradoxically, 
played a significant factor in the way in which the EU has been able to establish and exert 
a role for itself in the international telecommunications policy-making arena. This has 
two core elements. First, the establishment of a governance framework at the EU level in 
which the European Commission, in particular, has come to play a very significant role. 
Second, the ability of the EU to develop itself as a representative of its Member States in 
global telecommunications policy making. A core argument of the paper is that the EU’s 
relatively high profile and success in respect of the first element has had a direct bearing 
on its ability to be influential in respect of the second.  
That the above paradox exists hinges on the very strong pressures for internationalization 
which have developed within telecommunications over the last 25 years. The paper 
shows how these have been utilized by the EU to develop and cement its position as a 
key international actor in telecommunications. Here, the EU has served as an essential 
coordination point for Member States to develop concerted responses to the agenda of 
internationalization in telecommunications. From this, the EU, through the European 
Commission, has played a key role in ‘uploading’ successfully to the global institutional 
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level, European policy preferences. The example of this highlighted in the paper is 
negotiations that led to the establishment of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
in the World Trade Organization in the late 1990s. Beyond this, the EU continues to play 
an important strategic role in representing its Member States in broader discussions on 
the evolution of global telecommunications. 
By contrast, the Internet is one of the newest core element of international electronic 
network communications. Importantly, unlike telecommunications, it did not develop 
within any of the territories of the EU Member States. From the early 1990s onwards, it 
became popularised and internationalized ‘outwards’ from the USA. As a consequence, 
the Internet presented a series of challenges and opportunities to the EU which it has 
aimed to address. The paper illustrates how organizationally and, more significantly, in 
terms of its infant political economy, the Internet presented a policy landscape to the EU 
and its Member States with which they had initially little or no knowledge or familiarity. 
The paper shows how in these circumstances, the EU was, eventually, able to present 
itself as an institutional means of ‘interpreting’ and influencing the evolving Internet 
governance agenda in a number of global Internet fora and processes.    
However, the paper argues that the EU has only been partially successful in assuming this 
role, in contrast to telecommunications. There are three core reasons for this: first, the 
newness of, and uncertainty around, the evolving Internet political economy, where there 
is evidence of an ongoing tension between well-established and newer forms of 
international communications policy engagement; second, the lack of any formal internal 
mandate for constructing positions on Internet governance; third, the broader external 
material and social context within which Internet governance has evolved. Unlike in 
telecommunications, this has presented challenges to the EU, and ultimately, constrained 
it at different times from achieving its aims in Internet governance through the projection 
of a clear and unitary position. Significantly, the contested nature of Internet governance 
more broadly, the strategic environment within which the EU has had to operate, and the 
problem of multi-representation of EU interests in global contexts, has meant that it has 
only been able to secure ‘incremental’ change  in the direction of securing its aims in the 
global Internet governance regime. 
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The article is structured as follows. The next section outlines the constituents of the 
analytical framework to be employed in considering the EU’s influence in global Internet 
and telecommunications policy contexts. The following two sections briefly outline the 
key features of the EU’s role in global Internet and telecommunications policy making 
with reference to the criteria of the analytical framework. The analysis finds that the EU 
has been able to play a more traditional and thus ‘straightforward’ negotiating role in 
telecommunications with considerable success in terms of fulfilling its constructed aims. 
In global Internet policy-making by contrast, the EU has struggled to assert a coherent 
policy position, despite signs that its position is at this stage fairly well - though not 
entirely consistently - articulated. The final section of the paper compares the EU’s 
performance in both cases and puts forward some conclusions regarding the conditions 
under which the EU is more likely, and less likely, to be influential as an international 
actor in global electronic communications policy.   
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
In order to explain the EU’s ‘actorness’ and thus its influence in the global 
telecommunications and Internet sub-sectors of electronic network communication, this 
article employs principally an analytical framework that draws on the literature on EU 
‘actorness’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; 2008) but also some specific work on the EU in 
international organizations (Jorgensen 2009) and the EU as a strategic actor (Smith and 
Xei 2009). The purpose of using such a framework is to unravel the context within which 
the EU is acting. Specifically, the aim is to investigate the opportunities that have enabled 
or constrained EU influence in the external environment of events, ideas and power; the 
capability of the EU to act (formulating and agreeing policy) in terms of the EU internal 
context and by virtue of its own identity, and, thirdly; related to opportunity and 
capability, the EU’s ability to shape the behaviour of others and how it achieves this (or 
not) in the institutional and broader procedural contexts of the two cases under 
investigation. Beyond this, we aim to assess what type of influence the EU has been able 
to exert, and whether it has, in its interaction with the global telecommunications and 
Internet governance regimes, been effective in terms of achieving its stated goals and 
aims.     
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The three main aspects of this framework need to be unpacked further. First, 
‘opportunity’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2008). EU external factors (Jorgensen 2009; 12), or 
as others have labelled it, the logic of the external opportunity structure (Smith and Xie 
2009; 9), denote the pressures and opportunities (to act) that arise from broader 
international structures in terms of both social and material content. For Jorgensen (2009: 
12) this entails examination of the: 1) international distribution of power 2) international 
interaction and social structures 3) the influence of other governments (and 
organizations) 4) the international cultural environment. When analysing 
telecommunications and Internet governance, these are important factors, not least 
because these two sub-sectors of communications, and the EU’s role within them, have 
evolved under different actor constellations, but with the US as primary in both (and thus 
the interaction between the EU and US significant), though less important in the case of 
telecommunications. Different local, national and global conditions and pressures also 
exist within different, though in part overlapping, timeframes in both cases. Finally, there 
are contrasting global institutions often underpinned by contradictory and contested 
governance principles in each case. Within telecommunications, for example, the 
movement away from the embedded liberalism of the 1970s towards the promotion of 
neoliberal ideas in the global political economy in the 1980s, of which the EU (through 
the European Commission) was a key protagonist, meant that it was ideally placed to 
influence the institutions that would govern world trade (WTO) and indeed to take a 
prominent position (alongside the US), in constructing, promoting and successfully 
embedding its own governance goals for the telecommunications sector internally and 
outwards through the WTO.        
Within Internet governance, it was less ideas than events that provided the EU with the 
opportunity to intervene in the evolution of the global institutions that would provide 
rules for governing the sector. The US was the hegemonic actor in the evolution of the 
Internet and, subsequently, the early structures and institutions that governed it. The 
Internet evolved within the US, but by the mid-1990s, the pressures of commercialization 
led to a call for reforms from key national and international stakeholders and, with this, 
the globalization of Internet governance in order to provide a legitimate and legal basis 
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for its increased use socially, financially and economically. Indeed, as Mueller (2002) 
demonstrates in his analysis of the creation of this body, the US government was 
instrumental in resolving tensions between rival coalitions in order to establish ICANN’s 
identity for this purpose (albeit contested): as a private, not-for-profit, organization 
underpinned by the principle of self-regulation and governed by US (California) law. 
Thus, whilst the EU was not in a position in terms of knowledge or influence to intervene 
in the initial deliberations and decisions of the US government to resolve ‘internal’ 
contestation and tensions in relation to the Internet, its established identity as powerful 
and important economic actor in the global political economy enabled it to enter the fray 
with the intention of playing a prominent role with the US, in defining the principles that 
would underpin ICANN working practices. In summary then, it was the pressures of 
globalization and the ideology of neoliberalism emanating from the US domestically, that 
allowed the EU to intervene as a significant actor within telecommunications, whereas 
with Internet governance, it was not the pressures of globalization/neoliberalism that 
drove the process per se, but, rather, the need to create a global institutional context to 
ensure the interoperability of the Internet.       
The second aspect of our framework refers to EU internal factors (Jorgensen 2009; 10); 
in other words, the EU’s capability to respond to opportunities in any given sector in 
order to shape the evolving (institutional) order. There are several aspects of this that are 
of interest to us in this paper. First, is the question of how far EU logic (see Smith and 
Xei 2009) is pre-eminent in the projection of any given position within the sectors we are 
exploring. In other words, how does the EU’s internal logic – its institutional structures, 
internal politics and identity shape the positions being taken in relation to 
telecommunications and Internet governance? Related to this are questions of not only 
internal coherence and consistency – that is vertical (between different levels of 
responsibility) and horizontal (between EU institutions) (see Nuttall 2005) - but also of 
which actors influence EU positions and projections (including private companies, 
transnational actors and interest groups) and indeed who represents the EU in the relevant 
international institutions within the sectors under investigation (Jorgensen 2009: 11). This 
is important, as internal executive division and more than one institutional voice can 
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often lead to a lack of coherence, coordination and clarity in the EU’s position and thus 
external capacity to influence. However, and as others have argued, many EU actor 
voices in any given international institution need not necessarily lead to ineffectiveness – 
as long as there is consistency and clarity in the position projected this might well 
facilitate an image among third parties, especially in the developing world, of the EU as a 
non-hegemonic and equal partner rather than hierarchical actor, within negotiations and 
deliberations (Elgström 2007).  
In terms of identity or political culture, this is also a significant factor in terms of both 
how the EU frames its own importance in a given issue area, but also the implications 
this has for the normative projections of the EU in any given sector. The EU’s influence 
in any global sector is very much connected to its evolving identity as a contributor to 
global order (Smith 2007) and the need to assert itself within any given arena precisely 
because of its identity. How, then, does the EU’s own cultural or normative framing of 
itself in a particular issue area impact on the projected solutions for policy and 
governance in any given sector?  Of course, this is not separate to the questions above on 
the EU’s internal politics – indeed there might well be contestation among the EU actors 
involved in constructing any given policy, with more than one narrative framing policy, 
which, again, has implications for how far the EU can influence any given sector through 
its actions in the relevant global fora.  The contradictions in the EU’s projections are thus 
also important in terms of the EU’s ability to influence. Overall, what is salient in terms 
of analyzing internal factors is to illuminate the extent to which EU policy processes 
either constrain or facilitate action in response to ‘opportunity’ in the telecommunications 
and Internet governance sector.              
Finally, the third dimension of the framework is that of the EU’s ‘presence’ as an actor 
within any given issue area – that is, the ability of the EU, given the opportunity structure 
and its capability, to exert influence beyond its borders (within global governance fora, in 
this case). From our perspective then, this is very much related to the EU’s identity (as 
above), but it does also denote purposive action (in contrast to Bretherton and Vogler’s 
definition). In this sense, the most important issue in this dimension is how the EU can 
influence the behavior of others in international fora, in this case the WTO, ICANN and 
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the IGF, given the way in which it has constructed and framed its policy projections on 
telecommunications and Internet governance. How, and through what processes and 
instruments, for example, will the EU engage in order to project its own position for the 
purpose of influencing the behavior of other actors towards its own goals, objectives 
(image)? The nature of the EU’s engagement, of course, very much depends on the 
regime context itself, as well as the EU’s own evolving identity and how this impacts on 
its engagement. Interesting in this context, is the contrast between telecommunications 
and Internet governance, and indeed, whether this leads to different EU strategies, and 
differentiated rates of effectiveness within and across the regime contexts.  On this, it is 
important to note that telecoms and Internet governance are most different cases that 
throw up different questions at an overarching level in terms of EU influence. In 
telecommunications, for instance, the analysis is less about influencing the institutional 
form within which telecoms negotiations play out (that is, the WTO), but rather the 
governance and policy framework for global telecommunications, underpinned by the 
EU’s own projection of how this should function. In terms of Internet governance, the 
still contested and aspirational nature and identity of its global institutions, in particular 
the IGF, a body currently under review, shifts the primary focus to the EU’s strategy and 
normative preferences for how such institutions should evolve and function. For 
telecommunications, the focus is on the EU construction of policy and subsequent 
activities within the WTO in influencing (primarily) the Basic Telecommunications 
Framework and in Internet governance, it is on how the EU has sought to shape the 
institutional design and reform of ICANN and the IGF in terms of its governance and 
policy-making processes.  The comparison of these cases will shed light on the dynamics 
and conditions within which the EU can influence policy and governance in two 
contrasting cases within the communications milieu.        
In summary then, the broad framework outlined above leads us to ask the three following 
core or overarching questions: 
1. What is the opportunity context which has led the EU to act in 
telecommunications and Internet governance?  
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2. How has the EU capitalized on this opportunity in telecommunications and 
Internet governance in terms of its internal logic – that is the politics and 
construction of policy and positions?  
3. Given the opportunity structure and the EU’s constructed position in telecoms and 
Internet governance, how has the EU engaged in the telecommunications and 
Internet governance regimes, and has this led to change a) in terms of the 
behavior or collective understanding of key actors towards EU norms and 
preferences in policy and governance (i.e. achieving EU aims) b) the EU’s own 
identity and action in telecoms and Internet governance?         
 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Opportunity/External logics 
Telecommunications, the oldest part of electronic network communications, has been 
viewed as a sector of strategic international importance since the late 19th century. Since 
then, successive efforts were made to coordinate international telegraphy, and thereafter 
telephony, at the international institutional level, a key landmark in which was the 
establishment of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as an agency of the 
United Nations in 1946. As telecommunications systems developed physically at the 
national level across the globe with the incremental roll out of infrastructure and delivery 
of service, so too developed a socio-economic normative framework for how 
telecommunications should be structured and delivered. This was predicated on the 
efficacy of the intertwined assumptions of natural monopoly and the social policy 
aspiration of universal service. Thus, telecommunications functioning and development 
became a key constituent of national policies irrespective of the political character of the 
systems in which they developed. This notwithstanding, the need to realize the 
international, if not global, potential of telecommunications was recognized, though its 
pursuit was expressly underpinned by inter-national coordination in the development of 
technical and economic standards, rather than integration. The classic example here was 
the international accounting rate system, developed within the ITU, between the 
monopoly (usually state owned) telecommunications administrations, essentially a series 
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of bilateral economic interface agreements to interconnect telecommunications traffic and 
share the associated call revenues.  
However, by the mid-1970s, this stable system of international telecommunications came 
under challenge from broader changes which were building in the international political 
economy. Here, upswings in the level of international production, driven by the efforts of 
increasingly powerful multinational companies, were underpinned by strongly articulated 
arguments in favour of increasing levels of international economic integration in pursuit 
of globalization. Electronic network communications came to be viewed by those at the 
forefront of economic internationalization as key tools to enable coordination and 
expansion of business activities. Technological changes which were occurring in 
telecommunications at the time promised faster and more sophisticated services with 
potentially global reach and were eagerly anticipated by corporate business users. At the 
same time, however, there was concern about the ability of the then existing structure of 
domestic and international telecommunications to deliver what was demanded on time 
and to the required standard.  
As has been well established, the movement for economic globalization developed both 
as a normative and practical strategy for change (see Cerny 2008). Here, free, competitive 
markets were extolled as a superior form of economic organization to nationalized, 
uncompetitive ones. Economic liberalism was reincarnated as free market neo-liberalism, 
very importantly with an international context and logic, packaged in the modernizing 
rhetoric of globalization. For neo-liberals, the telecommunications sector presented itself 
as a clear case for reform and development at the international level. This model was first 
articulated in the US, whose commercial and governmental interests became key 
advocates for change in telecommunications to be undertaken along neo-liberal lines. 
Pressure was exerted for the required political-institutional changes to be effected at the 
national and global levels. Implied in this was fundamental reorganization in the 
institutional governance of telecommunications. Here, a model of replacing state 
ownership and provision with independent regulation of competitively ordered, 
internationally open, markets began to gain influence, initially, beyond the US, in the 
UK. This presented a clear challenge to the architects of the traditional 
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telecommunications systems nationally and internationally. For others, not least the 
European Union, it presented clear opportunities.  
EU internal  
As the 1980s evolved, the EU began to increase its focus on telecommunications as a 
policy area of strategic priority. In its policy statements on telecommunications, the 
European Commission took significant pains to point out to Member States the 
challenges presented by the EU’s main external economic competitors, the US and Japan, 
in a changing, increasingly globally competitive, sector to which Member States needed 
to respond (European Commission 1984). By contrast, the Commission showed political 
astuteness in highlighting to Member States opportunities to be gained through utilizing 
the EU institutional context to effect necessary change in telecommunications. The EU 
was at the time pursuing the wider project of the Single European Market whose broad 
objectives, the Commission argued, were co-terminus with changes necessary in 
telecommunications. Key policy proposals were thus presented in a landmark Green 
Paper (European Commission 1987), effectively beginning a process of significant 
transfer of sovereignty from the national to the EU level in telecommunications. As a 
consequence, the character of telecommunications governance in Europe has been very 
significantly ‘EU-ised’. Whilst the Southern states of the EU (France, Spain and Italy 
principally) as well as some of its smaller states, were initially reticent about adopting the 
reform of telecommunications along the lines proposed by the Commission, by the early 
1990s all EU Member States had accepted neo-liberal arguments, propounded forcefully 
by increasingly commercially oriented telecommunications service providers, 
multinational business users and key powerful EU States such as the UK, Germany, and 
eventually, France (see Humphreys and Simpson 2005). The Commission’s policy 
persuasiveness in its ‘domestic’ context was soon to be replicated in its efforts to secure a 
united EU negotiating front in telecommunications at the global institutional level. 
Internally therefore, since the late 1980s, a battery of legislation has developed at EU 
level prescribing the shape of liberalized and harmonized telecommunications across the 
EU (Thatcher 2001, Goodman 2006, Thatcher and Coen 2008). Successive regulatory 
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packages have been devised and refined through time. A clear pattern of vertically 
ordered institutional resources for the delivery of the EU telecommunications framework 
is discernible. At the supranational level, the European Commission has played a key role 
in proposing legislation upon which Member states vote, but also in monitoring the 
implementation of agreed measures. This it does in conjunction with a series of 
independent national regulatory authorities. Whilst this process has been far from 
smooth, there is no doubt that the EU has become a key actor in the functioning and 
evolution of a competitively ordered, increasingly internationally oriented 
telecommunications sector in the EU. There has also been some important regulatory 
institution building at the European level in the shape of the European Regulators Group 
and the newly created Body of European Regulators in Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) (Simpson 2009). 
Presence 
Whilst the EU has grown in institutional importance in telecommunications internally, it 
has also developed a key position as an international political actor on behalf of its 
Member States in telecommunications. A sign of this was European Commission’s 
efforts as far back as the late 1980s to challenge the ITU’s well established system of 
international telecommunications bilateral accounting rates. The Commission argued 
correctly that these rates were a gross over-estimation of the economic cost of providing 
international voice telephonic services. It is interesting to note that both large corporate 
business telecommunications users, represented in peak level bodies such as the 
International Telecommunications Users Group and, very importantly, the US 
government, were key powerful advocates of the position taken by the European 
Commission (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). This period also witnessed a broader 
institutional challenge to the ITU’s dominance in telecommunications which was 
reflective of the paradigmatic changes occurring across the sector and in the broader 
global political economy. Specifically, as economic globalization rose up the political 
agenda, issues of international trade and associated marketisation measures became 
paramount, leading to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.  
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The WTO immediately became the institutional focus for advocates of the global neo-
liberal model of telecommunications and in the process represented a powerful challenge 
to the ITU. Unlike in the latter, the EU was able to position itself prominently within the 
new WTO and proved effective in securing and putting forward a united position from its 
Member States in key negotiations that led to the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications in 1997. Whilst far from centre stage in the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations which culminated in 1994 and led to the inception of the WTO, 
telecommunications was nonetheless a prominent sector tabled by states in which the 
neo-liberal model had been adopted. The key players interested in developing a global 
trade agreement were the US, but also Japan and the EU.  
In 1994, a landmark, though far from universally adopted, trade liberalization agreement 
in advanced telecommunications services was secured as part of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services. However, a larger goal was the creation of a global trade agreement 
on so-called basic telecommunications services, intensively pursued in the WTO in the 
immediate years after its inception and leading to the creation of the ABT in 1997. 
Throughout the negotiations leading to the latter, the European Commission was a key 
player. Between 1988 and 1994, EU Member States had made agreements at EU level to 
liberalise all telecommunications services and infrastructures by 1998. However, there 
was reticence among some EU states, notably France, at pursuing market liberalization in 
the global institutional context. The European Commission was assisted by the fact that, 
according to Singh (2008), negotiations that occurred were of a technocratic, problem-
solving nature. Here, the EU’s ‘Article 113 Committee’, named after the legal measure 
which permits the European Commission to represent its Member States in international 
negotiations, was important in developing common negotiating values in the face of 
skepticism from a number of its own states, such as France. In fact, through ensuring that 
its Member States made a commitment to allowing 100% foreign ownership market 
access, the EU even went beyond the parameters of its internal telecommunications 
liberalization programme (Singh 2008). 
A key aspect of the ABT, aside from liberalization commitments made by signatories, 
was the adoption of the so-called Reference Paper (adopted by 63 of the original 69 
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signatories of the ABT) which amounts to a series of disciplines aimed at delivering the 
promised market access and opening and free competition of the ABT. Whilst the US 
was the initial driver of the Reference Paper, the negotiations leading to its adoption, in 
which the European Commission played a key role, saw the paper develop very much 
along the lines of the liberalization and harmonization package agreed among EU 
Member States, even to the extent of including a commitment on universal service 
provision in an overwhelmingly liberal market package (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). 
More recently, the EU has continued to press for a widening and deepening of the ABT. 
In 2000, for example, it put forward a proposal that all WTO Members ‘commit for 
Modes 1,2, and 3 all sub-sectors and all modes [of telecommunications services] without 
restrictions…and include as additional commitments the whole Reference Paper on BT’ 
(WTO 2000: 4). In 2005, it joined a key list of allies, including the US, Canada, Japan 
and Hong Kong China to urge all WTO Members to do similarly (WTO 2005). Beyond 
international trade liberalization in the WTO, the EU has more recently aimed to 
consolidate its position as a key actor in developing and representing its Member States’ 
interests in telecommunications on the global stage. In 2007, it launched a wide-ranging 
consultation as part of its i2010 initiative aimed at producing a new EU strategy, one aim 
of which was to promote ‘the competitiveness of Europe’s ICT industry in global markets 
and promote EU interests worldwide’ (European Commission 2007: 1) though a planned 
2008 Commission Communication based on the results of the consultation never 
materialized.  
INTERNET GOVERNANCE  
Opportunity/External logics 
As has already been noted above, the EU’s involvement in and influence on the evolution 
of a global Internet governance system effectively came about after the rapid evolution of 
the Internet in the US through first military and then academic and civilian networks. In 
contrast to other electronic communications sub-sectors such as telecommunications, the 
EU had not articulated its position on the Internet until the late 1990s, with the 
Bangemann report, Europe and the Global Information Society (1994), only briefly 
touching on issues relating to the Internet. The opportunity for increased involvement in 
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shaping the evolution of global institutions for Internet governance, and more 
specifically, the management of Internet address domain names, emerged in a context 
where the US government was the leading strategic actor by virtue of the fact that it 
effectively ‘owned’ the ‘A’ root server at the core of the system’s functioning. Despite 
this, and the fact that the Internet had grown domestically, the global interoperability of 
the Internet meant that important global actors, the EU among them, had to be included in 
any process of the internationalization of domain names.  In this context, the EU was able 
exert its own normative preferences (through value creating tactics – see Singh 2008: 
241) for the global institutionalization of the domain name system, even though the US 
was, in essence, the primary negotiating actor among the other interests and coalitions 
involved.    
Thus, the normative parameters for the governance of domain names was decided by the 
intervention of the US government in the domestic debate and international deliberation 
that emerged on globalizing domain names; of which, the outcome in terms of 
governance principles was a self-regulatory, not-for-profit, private organization 
underpinned by US law, which was effectively a compromise between those (technical 
community) with a post-industrial vision of the Internet and those with 
commercial/business and economic interests that wanted a clear legal basis for the 
expansion of domain names. Whilst the EU had produced guidelines for the governance 
of Electronic Commerce through its Bonn Ministerial Declaration (1997) essentially 
reflective of those in the Framework for Global Electronic Commerce produced by the 
US, it was in the subsequent debates and negotiations over the US Department of 
Commerce Green papers (1998a) and statement of policy in the form of a White paper 
(1998b) that the EU, and more specifically, the European Commission, really woke up to 
and reacted on the US position, securing several concessions in the process. The main 
criticisms levied were based on US unilateral control of the emerging domain name 
system and the lack of multilateral governmental influence in the proposals to establish 
ICANN.  More recently, the global financial crisis, and the expiration of the Joint Project 
Agreement (2006) between the US Department of Commerce and ICANN (essentially 
relinquishing US unilateral control over ICANN) provided the space and opportunity for 
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the EU to take stock of its achievements in Internet governance and to reassert, within its 
own image and identity, the way forward, focusing in particular on how external and 
multilateral accountability can be incorporated into ICANN processes (how the AoC will 
work), and on the future of the IGF. 
EU-internal  
The above dynamic opportunity structure within the global Internet governance space, 
provided the European Commission with a relative advantage compared to the EU 
Member States (and the EU Telecommunications Committee in which national Member 
States were represented) early on. Certain individuals in Directorate General Information 
Society (DG IS) had developed a strong and leading knowledge and understanding of the 
Internet and Internet policy. Thus, at the outset, the European Commission was able to 
assert itself as somewhat of a policy entrepreneur in Internet governance. An ad hoc 
group – the Internet Informal Group (IIG) - was established within the Council of 
Ministers under the initiative of Christopher Wilkinson, from DG IS; and he was also 
instrumental in proposing the launch and construction of the dot eu top level domain 
name. However, as knowledge in relation to Internet governance evolved, the influence 
of the Commission was constrained by the governmental representatives within the High 
Level Group on Internet Governance (HLIIG) which was established internally and 
separate to the IIG to provide strategic direction on a broad range of issues (beyond 
ICANN and GAC) relating to Internet governance. The IIG still exists as an informal 
body which is chaired by the Commission and which consists of Member State GAC 
representatives. Its purpose, however, is to simply discuss issues relating to ICANN and 
the GAC – in the words of one IIG member, ‘it doesn’t seek to establish a position on 
anything…it is just a way of like-minded – and most of us are like-minded - European 
GAC reps doing a bit of thought-sharing – anticipating how the ICANN meeting is going 
to go and what this year’s problems are and what is coming up next…a bit of reporting 
because some European GAC members are more active on specific topics that than others  
so they can share their knowledge’ (Author’s interview April 2010).  
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In this context it is important to note that there is no formal mandate or process for the 
construction of positions and policy on Internet governance. Thus, although the HLGIG 
is the lead actor in coordinating MS positions, there is no formal requirement to do so. It 
has ‘developed a mechanism for drafting and consulting on what [EU] letters or positions 
would say whether they be from the Commission or the Presidency’ (Author’s interview, 
2010) but it only does this on the basis of issues that it deems important that the EU 
speaks with a single voice (such as the expiration of the JPA and the ongoing review of 
the IGF)i. The lack of a formal legal competence, of course, has several implications for 
internal (in) coherence and indeed the way in which messages are projected outwards on 
Internet governance. Internally, it has provided the opportunity for the Commission 
(especially under former Commissioner Vivienne Redingii
Furthermore, and within the broader Internet governance processes and fora, the EU has 
been represented by both the country holding the EU Presidency and the European 
Commission – but not always in a consistent or indeed coordinated way. This situation of 
multi-representation is also evident within the IGF – and this, alongside the lack of any 
formal process and thus ‘EU’ representation has quite often been a source of confusion 
for other actors and stakeholders and has only served to exacerbate that age old problem 
of who exactly speaks for the EU. Indeed it has often led to projections of divergent 
positions – with the HLGIG (as principle) often having to reign in an often ambitious 
Commission (as agent) with its own political agenda on Internet governance. As one 
), without reference to or 
consultation with the HLGIG, to assert and project its own vision and agenda. The end 
result has been that of many messages from the EU on critical Internet governance issues 
which has led to suspicion and tension between certain members of the HLGIG and 
various Commission personalities (and indeed between other key GAC players and the 
Commission). It has also meant that there is no formal ‘EU’ representative that sits within 
the GAC - the Commission has a seat because of dot eu, but does not represent the EU as 
a whole – and there are also individual EU MS representatives which although do meet 
before any GAC meeting (and thus have some form of coordinative mechanism) through 
the IIG, do not speak with an EU voice but as representatives of their respective 
countries.  
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official has noted on certain Commission interjections on Internet Governance ‘we have 
always been wary of the Commission driving the Internet agenda’ (authors’ interview, 
2010). Indeed, where the Commission has sought to project uncoordinated messages it 
has been forced, by the HLGIG, to retract them publically or at least acknowledge that 
they were personal views or statements rather than an EU position. Nevertheless, this has 
often resulted in a confusing message for those stakeholders trying to decipher the 
‘official’ EU position (which is derived through the informal HLGIG mechanism) and 
those positions often released without consultation with the HLGIG by the Commission. 
It seems in the case of Internet governance the informality of the internal EU process can 
work well for producing single positions (this is the case for IGF and the AoC, for 
instance), but that it can also be quite detrimental to projecting an effective voice given 
the ability of key EU actors to project different (personal) messages.       
In identity terms, it is clear that the EU’s projections for Internet governance were 
imbued with its internal multilateral and its legal and regulatory state logic that has 
evolved within communications and more broadly, in relation to the Single Market. Its 
interaction with such global institutions, however, and indeed the Internet community 
more broadly, has also meant that the EU has absorbed certain norms, albeit with an EU-
twist, in the development of its own policy on the Internet and indeed its policy positions 
in relation to global Internet governance. The global financial crisis has only led to 
reassertion of the EU’s belief that private sector leadership in Internet governance must 
be underpinned by clear public policy rules to ensure external and multilateral 
accountability (European Commission 2009). It is also clear that its interjections in 
Internet governance have been underpinned by its often projected self-image as an 
important global player and even leader on the issue of the nature and form of the global 
institutions and processes that should regulate the Internet (Ibid).      
Presence 
Given the informal nature of the construction of positions on Internet governance it is not 
surprising that the EU (even by its own admission, see European Commission 2009) has 
had mixed results in achieving its policy objectives on Internet governance, that is: 
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• Balanced and equal oversight of some of ICANN’s activities by public authorities  
• Rules to govern generic domains, notably database ownership and separation of 
registries’ and registrar’s activities  
• The transfer of the management of the root server system from the US 
Department of Commerce to ICANN, under appropriate international supervision 
by public authorities  
Why has this been the case? The explanation, we argue, can be found in the external 
context and in particular the strategic (structural power) role of the US in negotiations 
and deliberations, the undecided and contested nature of Internet governance among the 
actors involved given their differing interpretations of the core principles that should 
underpin the system, and the multiple EU voices (some reflecting the ‘official’ EU 
position and others not) projected on Internet governance.  
In terms of ICANN, the EU, led by the European Commission, was effective in obtaining 
important concessions in the initial negotiations for its construction. Given the 
concentration of power within the US and its leadership role, however, it was only able to 
do this through value based tactics and arguments that alluded to the credibility of the US 
in the context of its pre-agreed principles with the EU on Internet Governance. The EU 
was able to play on the fact that the US proposals were not reflective of a truly global 
system of domain name management given the unilateral control the US would retain 
within ICANN, and the lack of equality between governments and the private sector in 
constructing policy and making decisions. Such a position was clearly derived from the 
EU’s own preferred normative governance framework, where co-regulatory arrangements 
involved a primary role for governments in decision making alongside and equal to 
private interests. Such reasoning, and the need for the US to achieve consensus, ensured 
the creation of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) within ICANN, which 
although allaying European concerns to a degree, was not seen as completely satisfactory 
given that it was only to have an advisory capacity (Christou and Simpson 2006, 2007) 
and that the only real mechanism for accountability and oversight was provided by the 
US.  The European Commission with the support of other international actors (such as 
the IP Community) also employed tactics of a normative nature in securing the creation 
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of a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy through World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO). The argument here was about the legitimacy of resolving 
disputes within a domestic context (i.e. courts where the registry, registry database or ‘A’ 
root server is located – see Singh 2008)) - thus the only way the US could actually reach 
consensus and satisfy the EU and the IP community was to ensure that a reputable and 
credible international organization was responsible for resolving disputes (although this 
was later criticized as biased towards the IP community). Having secured its concessions, 
the European Commission was then able to gain the support of the European domestic 
sector (MS representatives, private sector and regional organizations) and to endorse the 
establishment of ICANN within communications to the European Parliament (see Singh 
2008: 244-5).          
Since its inception, both within (in the GAC) and outside ICANN, the EU has sought to 
consistently secure movement on the two issues that it initially thought problematic when 
ICANN was established; that is, unilateral oversight by the US government, and the role 
of governments within the organization. Whilst through socialization and reform, the 
governments within the GAC have acquired a de facto political veto right for decisions 
with a public policy implication (Kleinwachter 2008: 17) the EU has not achieved its aim 
of complete equality between actors. Moreover, the global financial crisis and the 
subsequent backlash against self-regulation provided a subtext for the EU to reinforce its 
concern about the ‘due consideration given by the ICANN Board to GAC advice’ 
(European Commission, Interview, 2009), and to push its case for further reform that 
provides equality for governments in ICANN procedures.  
However, whilst Commission projections have often suggested more than an advisory 
role for governments, a representative of the HLGIG has suggested that ‘if you were 
going to characterize a [EU] European position to the GAC it is not to be more than 
advisory…it is to ensure that what it says is respected by the Board…and the Board 
justifies any decision not to follow GAC advice’ (authors’ interview, 2010). Indeed, in 
the context of the new Affirmation of Commitments (which replaced the Joint Project 
Agreement between the US Department of Commerce and ICANN on 1 October 2009), 
which is providing more of role for the GAC in reviewing ICANN procedures and 
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ensuring it is accountable internationally, and the internal joint GAC-ICANN working 
group which is reviewing how the GAC operates, the kind of mechanisms it has, how it 
makes representations to the Board, and how the Board reacts to those representations, 
the EU position is that  ‘…we are not trying to gain more power within the ICANN 
family…we are not saying that…they [members of the Commission] might have said that 
in the past but it is not what we [the HLGIG] are saying now…we are supporting the 
model…governments have a role to play and governments have a greater role under the 
AoC…but as do the other constituencies as well…so we are not arguing that there should 
be more government intervention in the management of ICANN…we are not arguing for 
that…I don’t think that there is anybody in the high level group that is pushing for that’ 
(authors’ interview, 2010). Indeed, this is a view that sees to be supported by current 
Commission officials involved in Internet governance, and reflected in a Presidency 
statement in support of the AoC and its new review procedures - even though certain 
projections under the leadership of Viviane Reding, in the context of the global financial 
crisis, suggested a much stronger role for governments within ICANN and Internet 
governance more generally. Such projections, one of which called for a ‘G12’ for Internet 
Governance (2009), was not only uncoordinated internally, but left stakeholders 
‘surprised’ in the multistakeholderism context (Internet Governance Hearing, May 2009), 
and the European Union embarrassed in its official representations and projections for 
Internet governance.  The official EU view then seems to resonate with that of other 
salient Internet governance stakeholders - that what is needed is a fine-tuning of the 
current multi-layered, multi-stakeholder system, with a clear definition of roles and 
functions for the actors involved (especially governments) rather than ‘more’ intervention 
and regulation by the state (Internet Governance Hearing, May 2009).  This is 
particularly important in the context of countries that do not participate in GAC or are 
sceptical of the GAC, and have pushed for a greater role for the ITU in domain name 
management as well as an IGF with decision-making powers in Internet governance (e.g. 
China).   
The EU then has supported the principle of multi-stakeholderism within Internet 
governance, both in ICANN and the IGF, the latter created as a compromise within the 
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WSIS process after the EU (represented by the UK Presidency at the time), supported by 
the developing world (against US unilateralism), put forth an alternative proposition for 
an intergovernmental structure, but failed to achieve its aims because of the US refusal to 
move on the underlying principles of private sector leadership and management and its 
belief that US control was essential for the security and stability of the Internet.  For the 
EU, the IGF was seen as an alternative forum for discussion and did not in any way 
replace existing institutional arrangements. Indeed, there is a high level of coherence 
internally within the EU (including strong support from the European Parliament) on the 
continuation of the IGF which has allowed the EU to speak with a single voice within the 
ongoing IGF review process (which commenced in 2010). In their recent assessment of 
the IGF the EU’s High Level Group on Internet Governance (HLGIG) concluded that it 
was a valuable ‘platform for non-binding multistakeholder dialogue on Internet 
governance’, and that its impact was displayed ‘in the light of what has followed outside 
the IGF in that the IGF has triggered follow-up discussions in the context of dynamic 
coalitions and inspired debates at all levels’ (Internet Governance Hearing, May 2009). 
On the basis of the HLGIG’s evaluation the formal EU position to presented by the 
Czech Presidency within the UN discussions on the IGF, has been that it should ‘continue 
as a non-decision making body for a further five years and at the end of that second 
period it should again be reviewed in terms of its desirability within a broader review of 
WSIS outcomes’ (Ibid 2009).              
However, despite a certain internal coherence and clarity in the official EU position on 
the IGF as a valuable forum for discussion, its influence in determining the outcome of 
the IGF evaluation process and the further evolution of Internet governance in order to 
meet its aims will ultimately also rest on it delivering a single and clear message – and in 
particular, demonstrating more obviously in practice its rhetorical commitment to multi-
stakeholderism in order to provide the EU with greater credibility internationally as an 
actor in Internet governance. Whilst this is clearly demonstrable at the national level 
within certain EU member states that have established national IGFs (e.g. the UK), and 
indeed with European Parliamentary statements supporting the establishment of a 
European IGF, there is less evidence to suggest that internally, the European Commission 
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and indeed the HLGIG has fully embraced the concept (beyond simple adaptation). 
Certain academic commentators have suggested that the HLGIG ‘should be more 
transparent and open in the context of multi-stakeholder governance, at least through 
publishing agendas and inviting non-members to meetings so that it can perhaps find its 
role in the broader European Internet community’ (Internet Governance Hearing, May 
2009). Others have argued that in the spirit of multi-stakeholderism the European 
Commission should take more of a lead in establishing a European IGF and organizing 
more local IGFs in order to coordinate European voices on Internet governance and 
indeed, present a stronger, single voice and message to international fora on Internet 
governance (Ibid). Indeed, even EU level officials have admitted that the Commission 
might not ‘walk the talk’ as much as it could on multi-stakeholderism (authors’ interview, 
2010).            
CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has shown the EU to have developed into an important actor in global 
electronic network communications policy-making through its activities in 
telecommunications and the Internet. The paper’s use of an ‘actorness’ analytical 
framework has pointed up a number of similarities, but also distinct differences, in EU 
behaviour in these related, though at the same time rather different, sub-sectors. The 
framework’s use also, more generally, points to conditions under which the EU is more 
likely, and less likely to be able to exert itself successfully in global sectoral contexts. 
The analytical parameters of opportunities/external logics, internal environment and 
external presence are useful in illustrating the contexts, opportunities and constraints 
faced by the EU.  
It is important to note that though telecommunications is much longer established than 
the Internet, in both cases the EU’s involvement as a global policy actor has been 
relatively recent. In both cases, the EU has faced an international environment in which 
US ideas and practices have dominated. In telecommunications, this provided more 
opportunities than constraints compared with the Internet. An explanation for this lies in 
the fairly obvious fact that EU Member States had developed over a much longer period 
 24 
knowledge of, and competence in, telecommunications compared to the Internet. It is also 
the case too that both parties (the EU and the US) arguably stood to gain most from 
pursuing a similar agenda of international trade liberalization in institutional contexts 
such as the WTO, in particular. Though a relatively new actor in telecommunications, the 
EU was able to become a representative of its Member States in the WTO despite some 
reservations from Member States. Given the relative and perhaps unusual coherence of 
EU positions, due in considerable part to internally based policy agreement made that had 
been ongoing before and simultaneous to global negotiations, the European Commission 
was viewed as the best means of securing EU interests in the WTO on 
telecommunications.  
The Internet presents a rather different situation. The EU was not able to develop any 
kind of coherent position on the Internet before it became a high profile global 
communications policy matter. However, like in telecommunications, the EU, through 
the European Commission in particular in the early period of intervention, proved 
enthusiastic and relatively adept at exploiting policy opportunities which arose. However, 
unlike in telecommunications, uncertainty married to the perceived need to react to policy 
developments which were viewed with some degree of concern, left the EU and its 
Member States ‘on the back foot’. Since the late 1990s, the EU has aimed to articulate 
and establish its interests in relevant global institutional contexts from a position of 
relative weakness, certainly compared to that experienced in the telecommunications 
case. The result has inevitably been one of partial success. A major constraint has been 
the relative power differential and key policy differences experienced viz-a-viz the US. 
There are, however, signs that the two parties, in particular with the new Obama 
administration, are much more aligned in their preferences for future Internet governance 
than they were in the late 1990s. The EU has gained policy ground, assisted by 
significant uncertainty and some turbulence in the development of global Internet policy 
agendas, which has involved contestation of ICANN, in particular and, lately, the IGF. 
The EU has, however, struggled in the past to project a clear, cogent message on Internet 
governance given the informal nature of its internal policy process for constructing 
positions on Internet governance, and the opportunities this afforded those in the 
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Commission with their own political agenda to influence global proceedings. The result 
was often multiple messages, multiple EU representatives in different global fora and 
confusion over what the ‘real’ EU position was.  This did not imbue the EU with the 
visibility or credibility required to be as influential as it could in many instances. More 
recently, with a change of Commissioner that seems to have taken a less assertive role 
(indeed she has been more interested in telecommunications but this is perhaps natural 
given her previous competition policy background), and agreement on the Lisbon Treaty, 
there has evolved an internal mechanism that is resulting in more consensual policy-
making and the projection of coherent EU positions in matters of crucial importance for 
the future of Internet governance (the IGF and the AoC). However, given the lack of 
legal mandate underpinning the policy process, this does not preclude individuals and 
institutions from projecting their own autonomous positions in the future without 
reference to the established, albeit informal mechanism established through the HLGIG. 
Moreover, the lack of formal EU representation will also be problematic if the EU has the 
ambition to be taken seriously as a ‘leader’ in Internet governance, beyond its own self-
projections. Addressing these two issues would certainly alleviate the problem of 
identifying first, the ‘official’ EU position, and second, who speaks and negotiates for the 
EU on Internet governance.             
In the future, the EU faces a major global policy challenge in each of the case studies 
under investigation in this paper. In telecommunications, it will need to re-invigorate its 
profile in bodies such as the WTO and the ITU. Recent efforts to do so appear to have 
run into the sand, not least because, since 2006, the EU has faced a major, and at times 
controversial, review of its internal telecommunications policy framework: this paper 
shows that relatively coherent internal policy positions assist external negotiation 
activity. Agreement on this having been attained at the end of 2009, the EU may now aim 
to exert its preferences for extensive global trade liberalization more forcefully, beyond 
the few policy statements and a consultation made to this effect in recent years. In 
Internet policy, the challenge for the EU is to refine, settle on and begin to extol in a 
unitary way, a clearer policy perspective within which different strategies can be created 
and deployed in respect of key policy areas and their respective institutional contexts. 
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Progress on these fronts is likely to ensure that the EU continues to be a significant actor 
in shaping the global communications policy milieu. 
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i This is done through consultation with the Commission before passing though the usual working groups 
and COREPER channels for agreement.    
ii The current Commissioner for Information Society and Media,  Neelie Kroes, has been less assertive  in 
relation to Internet governance and it is noticeable that the Commission seems to have moved towards a 
more consensual approach internally on Internet governance given her appointment (author’s interview, 
2010).    
